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The  complexity  derived  from  the  bilateral  trade  liberalisation  process  in  the 
Mediterranean region is difficult to represent in a trade model, not only because of the 
range of instruments still constraining trade but also because of the special nature of the 
most important traded goods (product differentiation and seasonality). 
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQ’s) and the entry price system are clearly defined on a monthly 
basis for the fruits and vegetables trade flows towards the European Union (EU). This 
point makes efforts to model such a trade in yearly basis not representative of reality. 
We  propose  a  static  partial  equilibrium  model  tailored  to  model  trade  impacts  of 
specific policy instruments which considers imports from different sources as imperfect 
substitutes, following the non-linear Armington type model.
Different  policy  scenarios  have  been  run  using  the  model,  considering  changes  in 
TRQ’s and Entry Price regimes, its tariffication and preference erosion. 
The  results  of  model  runs  show  that,  as  regards  to  EU  producers,  bilateral  trade 
liberalisation with extension of TRQs would be the least dramatic scenario. By contrast, 
the phasing out  of  the  entry price  system  would  have serious  consequences  on  EU 
producers. The model has also given detailed information on Morocco’s interests in the 
negotiation, although  it  could easily include  a larger  number  of  suppliers. Morocco 
appears to be interested in multilateral liberalisation as well as in bilateral liberalisation. 
In  fact,  multilateral  liberalisation  will  not  cause  a  great  deal  of  preference  erosion 
against Moroccan exporters, unless tariff reductions only affect MFN suppliers.1
F&V Trade Model to assess Euro-Med 
Agreements. An application to the fresh tomato 
market.
1. Introduction
The analysis of regional trade liberalisation remains an interesting area of research. A 
large number of countries are taking part in preferential agreements. This is also true for 
the Mediterranean region.
Complexity is a word that defines the bilateral trade liberalisation process in the region. 
This complexity is difficult to represent in a trade model, not only because of the range 
of instruments still constraining trade but also because of the special nature of the most 
important traded goods (product differentiation and seasonality). 
The  commercial  integration  process  among  the  European  Union  and  a  number  of 
countries from the Mediterranean basin has been making progress during last years, 
within the framework launched in the 1995 Barcelona Conference (see Garcia-Alvarez-
Coque,  2002).  Within  this  framework,  the  EU  holds  preferential  trade  agreements 
(PTAs)  with  its  Mediterranean  neighbour  countries  -or  Southern  Mediterranean 
Countries (SMCs)- in the path towards the establishment of the EMFTA. The process is 
quite  dynamic  and  not  all  SMCs  are  in  the  same  stage  of  implementation  of  their 
corresponding FTA (ideally, to be completed by 2010).
One major fact of the EMFTA is that there is one major sector that is still excluded from 
the  free  trade  area  provisions:  agriculture.  The  five  year  programme  agreed  in  the 
Barcelona Mediterranean Conference (27-28 November 2005) foresees the progressive 
liberalisation of trade in agriculture, but “with a possible selected number of exceptions 
and timetables for gradual and asymmetrical implementation, taking into account the 
differences  and  individual  characteristics  of  the  agricultural  sector  in  different 
countries”. 
In terms of analysing the EMFTA, the fact that a number of countries are negotiating 
with  the EU  and implementing  agreements  at  a various stages  makes  it  difficult to 
model the trade effects of the Euro-Mediterranean FTAs. Furthermore, actual preference 2
margins  enjoyed  by  one  specific  third  country  in  the  EU  are  depending  on  the 
preferences  granted  to  other  third  countries.  Consequently,  the  results  of  modelling 
efforts can hardly be considered as forecasts of future developments. They rather reflect 
or simulate the size of the potential economic impacts, depending on the nature of the 
preferences granted. 
 Preferences  and  TRQs.  The  formal  structure  in  all  EMAs  is  very  similar, 
although  they  may  differ  in  the  specific  quantitative  parameters  of  trade 
concessions in agriculture (tariff reduction, products covered and quantitative 
limits). However, tariff concessions are limited to negotiated quantities  for a 
number of “sensitive” products. TRQs can easily neutralise the market access 
theoretically improved by tariff preferences.
 Entry prices. The entry price system applies to a group of fruits and vegetables 
considered particularly sensitive by the EU. It guarantees that imports are not 
sold  on  EU  markets  below  a  ‘minimum  entry  price’.  This  system  is  in 
contradiction with the spirit of tariffication. Third countries apparently accepted 
this approach as a quid pro quo for the continuing opportunity to export to the 
EU at high prices without facing high tariffs. Significant reductions of entry 
prices for limited quantities of some products have been negotiated and agreed 
with Morocco, Egypt and Israel, creating a preference margin.
 Seasonal windows. In some periods of the year the EU market seems to be more 
open to foreign trade than in other periods. A yearly approach for modelling 
F&V trade flows could hardly catch the complexity of this seasonal regulation 
and its practical consequences. For this reasons, a model will have as one of its 
features a seasonal definition of the unknowns, allowing us to make a detailed 
representation of the changing trade policies that export supplies are facing. 
In horticultural markets, non-price factors matter. It is striking that for some products, 
the  actual  exports  by  SMCs  to  the  EU  have  been  below  the  quantitative  limits,
suggesting supply constrains faced by these countries but also the fact that the demand 
is differentiated by quality/origin. This is probably good news for Southern European 
farmers.  In  general,  for  products  like  fresh  fruit  and  vegetables  it  is  not  easy  to 
transform theoretical market opportunities into concrete market realities. 
In  brief,  our  intention  is  to  propose  a  model  approach  which  joins  the  following 
characteristics:3
1. It is  a partial equilibrium  model,  tailored to model trade impacts of specific 
policy instruments. 
2. It considers imports from different sources as imperfect substitutes, which can 
be undertaken through and a non-linear Armington (1969) type model.
3. The market modelled is the EU-25.
4. The composite demand is formed by different sources, including the intra-EU25 
sources plus the most important EU-25 suppliers. The pilot model for tomato, 
for example, takes the EU-25, Morocco and the Rest of the World (ROW) as 
major  suppliers.  The  extensions  of  the  model  easily  increase  the  number  of 
supply regions.
5. The projections are based on comparative static simulations. In the first versions 
of the model, there is no significant interdependence between consuming and 
producing  decisions  between  any  given  pair  of  monthly  periods.  A  certain 
degree of dynamism is included through a shifter to be applied on the supply and 
demand equations. Future versions of the trade model will define more complex 
structure on monthly price expectations, which consider monthly production and 
consumption across the year as the result of a one step choice.
The F&V model draws on the existing knowledge, mainly based on the methodological 
basis presented by Francois and Hall (1997)
1. Nevertheless, our model offers a value-
added by a detailed specification of policy impacts through:
1. A detailed specification of policy measures. Thus, the model has to be able to 
make explicit representation of:
o TRQs
o MFN Entry prices
o Entry prices agreed with selected Mediterranean partners
o Ad valorem and additional tariffs applied to certain F&V
2. Specific  estimation  of  policy  impacts  on  a  seasonal  basis,  if  possible  at  the 
monthly level.
                                                
1 A similar approach, though using linear equations can be found in Sarris (1983).4
2. Model equations
Let us define the main model variables and parameters:
Pj is the internal price of good originating at j
P is a composite index of internal prices of product originating at various sources.
Wj is the export price of good originating at j
αi  is the allocation parameter to aggregate imports from different sources.
E is total expenditure on EU imports at internal prices.
k
M        is a constant term for the demand for total imports
k
Ej
        is a constant term for the export supply of good originating at j
  is the elasticity of substitution
t j
o
 is the extra-quota total duty (or the only duty when TRQ is not defined)..
t j
w
 is the price wedge on country j imports.
η  is the demand for total imports, including intra-EU and extra-EU partners’ goods.
μj  is the export supply of good originating at j to the EU market.
M
qj is the total quota volume for product originating at j
Mj = import flow originating at j
q = total composite demand.
Xj = export flow originating at j
Model description
For the sake of easing the model description, we assume in the next equations that 
preferential suppliers are not constrained by tariffs (though they could be restricted by 
TRQs).  However,  the  model  extension  to  the  case  where  tariffs  also  apply  to 
preferential suppliers is straightforward. Moreover, the actual empirical exercises are 
based on the fact that preferential suppliers are actually facing tariffs.
Demand side:
We  first  define  the  composite  good,  q,  as  a  CES  composite  of  intra-EU  good  and 
imports from different regions. Total composite good demand can be described by a 























i i P P , where  = (-1)/
While equation [1] represents the total EU import demand, i.e., for tomato, we need to 
describe the specific demand for imports from the considered regions. Thus, the import 



















Consequently, the demand side is defined by a composite import demand plus specific 
demands for imports from different exporting regions.
Supply side:
Supply functions are specified as a function with constant supply elasticity. Again, 
imports originating at various regions are separately modelled. Thus, supply of imports 
originating at j: 
X j = k j
E[Wj]
μj
    [3]















Note that a price wedge is defined when imports face TRQs. In the basic formulation a 
preferential supplier not  constrained by TRQs, when these are not binding,  t j
w
= 0. 
When  TRQs  are  binding,  then  a  price  wedge  is  defined  and  has  to  be  calculated 
endogenously. When exports are over the TRQ limits, then the maximum price wedge is 
applied, which is, for this case, equal to the maximum tariff  t j
o
.
Actually,  in  the  first  applications  of  the  model,  a  differentiation  is  made,  for  each 
supplier,  between  the  actual  tariff  applied,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  price  wedge 
resulting of the implementation of TRQs, on the other.6
System equations: 
The model is finally constructed through a system of non-linear equation, which can be 
solved through the use of GAMS programming.
The equations to be solved are:
1. Excess of demand good originating at j must be zero:  
Mj - j X  =  0
Replacing import demand (equation [2]) and import supply (equation [3]) the excess 
demand condition is:
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 Replacing Wj by its value in terms of Pj:






































2. Total import demand. This can be expressed as follows:  
0
1  
 E P k
M 
Note that the equation above is specified just by multiplying the composite demand 
for the composite price and rearranging.

















i i P P [5]
Then the system to solve is formed by n  +2 equations and n + 2 unknown variables (n
prices, total expenditure E and composite price P).
TRQs:
As indicated above the price wedge for preferential suppliers can get three kinds of 
values, depending on the size of imports compared to the applied TRQs. For cases 
where preferential tariffs are nil:
a) M j  < M
qj then  t j
w
 = 0
b) M j  = M
qj then   0 <  t j
w
<  t j
o
, and  t j
w
 is estimated endogenously. 
c) M j  > M
qj then  t j
w
=  t j
o7
Calibration
Calibration  is  based  on  unit  price  normalisation,  so  that  all  constants  are  equal  to 
benchmark  expenditures.  If  a  TRQ  is  binding  we  have  to  propose  a  value  for  the 
reference price wedge. However, if Mj >M
qj then the price wedge is taken as the initial 
out-of-quota tariff  t j
o
.
3. Model application.  Policy measures in the benchmark scenario
Tomato  is  a  good  illustration  and  very relevant  for  the  EU  agriculture.  EU  tomato 
market is a good example of : (i) protection levels which change from a month to the 
next;  (ii)  specific  border  measures,  such  as  entry  prices  and  TRQs;  (iii)  tariff 
concessions to Mediterranean countries, in the form reduced “agreed entry prices” and 
tariff levels.
Modelling preferences with entry prices and TRQs
If we have a look to the Moroccan SIV level compared to the Entry Price level and to 
the actual Moroccan imports compared to the TRQs, we find a number of reference 
situations,  which  reflect  the  complexity  of  EU  tomato  trade  policies,  even  for 
preferential suppliers. The situations are shown in following table:






Actual trade > TRQ ?
January Yes Yes Yes
February Yes Yes No
March Yes No Yes
April Yes Yes Yes
May Yes No Yes
June No No No TRQ
July Yes Yes No TRQ
August No No No TRQ8
September No No No TRQ
October No No No
November No No Yes
December No No Yes
Source: authors’ calculations.
Only  in  June,  August, September  and  October,  Moroccan imports  appear not  to  be 
constrained  by  Entry  Prices  (EP)  nor  by  TRQs.  In  March,  May,  November  and 
December,  the  only  constrain  is  the  TRQ,  but  is  clear  that  in  March  and  May  the 
Moroccan trade is favoured by the reduced agreed EP and that the loss of preference 
could have serious consequences because the Moroccan price undercuts the MFN Entry 
Price. In February and July Moroccan exports are constrained by the EP but TRQ are 
not  constraining the import  flows. Finally, in  January and April, Moroccan trade  is 
constrained by both the EP and the TRQ, and there is not a clear advantage of being a 
preferential supplier with respect to MFN suppliers. 
Although a detailed description of the entry price system can be found in Swinbank and 
Ritson (1995) and Grethe and Tangermann (1998), we can stress that the fact that there 
is an Entry price for Moroccan imports (within a quantity limit) and an Entry price for 
MFN imports leads us to consider three possible situations, in order to calculate the size 
of  the  minimum  (preferential)  tariff  t j
i
  and  maximum  tariff  t j
o
  to  be  applied  to 
Moroccan imports to the EU market:
• When Moroccan import price > MFN Entry price:
t j
o




where “x” refers to an agreed percentage of reduction for preferential suppliers. This 
percentage of reduction for Moroccan tomato is 60 percent. 
• When MFN Entry price > Moroccan import price > Agreed Entry price:
t j
o




The additional tariff is the corresponding tariff which triggers when the entry price is 
undercut.  The  agreed  entry  price  is  the  reduced  entry  price  foreseen  in  the 
EuroMediterranean Association Agreement.
• Moroccan import price < Agreed Entry price
t j
o
 = x % MFN Ad Valorem Tariff + Additional Tariff
t j
i
 = Additional Tariff
This last situation happens when the additional tariff is charged on Moroccan imports 
because even the agreed the entry price is undercut. Note that  t j
o
 is the total charge that 
would  be  applied  on  Moroccan  imports,  if  they  would  not  receive  the  preferential 
treatment anymore, which is the case, for example, when the TRQ is overcome.
Table 2 shows the monthly effective tariffs  t j
i
 and  t j
o
for Moroccan tomato, which 
have been calculated from 2004 data, i.e. SIV, entry prices and full tariffs (ad valorem 
tariffs plus additional tariffs related to the entry price system). Tariffs are expressed in 
their Ad Valorem Equivalents.
Table 2.  In-quota and out-of-quota tariffs on Moroccan tomato imports (2004)
Month t j
i
 (% SIV) t j
o
 (% SIV)
SIV with respect MFN and agreed entry 
prices
January 77,6 81,1 SIV < Agreed EP
February 79,5 83,0 SIV < Agreed EP
March 0,0 41,1 Agreed EP < SIV < MFN EP
April 105,7 109,2 SIV < Agreed EP
May 0,0 52,1 Agreed EP < SIV < MFN EP
June 5,7 5,7 SIV > MFN EP
July 12,1 12,1 SIV < Agreed EP
August 5,7 5,7 SIV > MFN EP
September 5,7 5,7 SIV > MFN EP
October 5,7 5,7 SIV > MFN EP
November 0,0 3,5 SIV > MFN EP
December 0,0 3,5 SIV > MFN EP
Source: European Commission, TARIC and authors’ calculations
It appears that the only periods in 2004 when the agreed (reduced) entry price really 
made a difference in favour of Morocco where March and May. In the rest of the year, 
either Moroccan prices were above the entry price (June, August to December), or the 
entry  price  system  penalised  both  MFN  and  Morocco’s  exports  (January,  February, 
April and July.10
4. Trade policy scenarios
The preliminary version of the F&V trade model is applied to study the trade impacts of 
several scenarios of trade liberalisation in the EU fresh tomato market. These scenarios 
are the following:
• Enlarging Moroccan tomato TRQs (“Enlarged TRQs”)
• Reducing or Eliminating Agreed Entry Prices (“Agreed Entry prices”)
• Reducing or Eliminating MFN Entry Prices  (“MFN Entry prices”)
• Converting entry prices into Equivalent Tariffs and reducing them by 50% 
(“Tariffication A”)
• Applying an uniform tariff across the year (“Tariffication B”)
• Preference erosion
1. Enlarging Moroccan tomato TRQs (Enlarged TRQs)
We  will  assess  the  impact  of  increasing  the  TRQs  by  50%.  In  the  counterfactual 
scenario  all  new  TRQ  are  not  binding  except  for  May.  In  those  months,  market 
equilibrium  for  most  months  (excepting  for  May)  will  not  be  constrained  by  the
existence of a quota. Because the new TRQ is still binding in May, the  t j
o
 will keep 
being the price wedge 52.1% (Table 2). However, the size of the quota rent will increase 
with the TRQ enlargement. We still assume in the preliminary model that quota rents 
are captured by the importers.
2. Reducing or Eliminating Agreed Entry Prices (“Agreed Entry prices”)
We  assume  in  this  scenario  that  the  entry  price  agreed  with  Morocco  within  the 
Association Agreement is phased out. This means that the additional tariff triggered by 
the entry price system for Morocco is phased out.  A significant reduction of tariffs 
would take place, only the ad valorem tariffs remaining.
3. Reducing or Eliminating MFN Entry Prices (“MFN Entry prices”)
If entry prices are phased out, this has an impact not only on Moroccan as well as MFN 
imports. Only ad valorem tariffs on tomato from Morocco would remain.11
4. Converting entry prices into Equivalent Tariffs and reducing them by 
50% (“Tariffication A”)
This scenario would be the result of taking the initial tariff equivalents and reducing 
them by 50%. Because it is probable that a specific tariff component will be maintained, 
the ad valorem equivalents may be different between the MFN suppliers and Morocco.
5. Applying an uniform tariff across the year (“Tariffication B”)
The  weighted  yearly  average  of  the  MFN  tariff  is  19.22%.  It  is  assumed  that  all 
previous tariffs on MFN products are replaced by this tariff for all months of the year. A 
preference on imports from Morocco is assumed to be kept by decreasing in-quota the 
Moroccan tariff to nil level and keeping the out-of-quota tariff to a 40% of the MFN 
level.
6. Preference erosion
There are many possible scenarios leading to a tariff reduction on MFN imports while 
keeping protection on Moroccan imports. In this exercise, we take the scenario number 
4 and assume that tariff reduction only applies to MFN suppliers.
5. Simulations’ results
Each one of the defined scenarios is assessed through running the F&V model. This 
consists of the equation system specified in Section 2. Equations are written in GAMS 
code. The preliminary simulations have been run assuming that the 
• elasticity of substitution   is the elasticity of substitution = 5;
• composite demand for imports’ elasticity  η  = 1;
• export supply elasticity for intra-EU good  μ1  = 2;
• export supply elasticity for each origin  μj  = 2;
The results displayed below have to be considered as “exercise simulations”. The value 
chosen  for  the  elasticity  of  substitution  is  quite  representative  of  a  market  where 
products are quite homogeneous (low product differentiation), so it is likely that the 
substitution effects are overestimated. In further developments of the F&V trade model, 
more realistic values for demand and supply elasticities will be included, drawing on the 12
available  econometric  literature.  Sensitivity  analysis  can  be  easily  carried  out  by 
changing the parameters in the GAMS file written for the model.
Simulations  results for EU tomato imports are presented as percentage changes and 
absolute values with respect to benchmark sales, which are presented in the Table 3 
below. Border and internal prices percentage changes corresponding to each source are 
computed.
Table 3. EU tomato imports (tons)
Intra EU25 ROW Morocco
2004.1 198280,6 6954,3 33388,9
2004.2 191838 5970 26762,7
2004.3 193730,8 7103,9 33571,8
2004.4 187170,5 3943,4 15874,6
2004.5 199144,5 1870,5 7957,9
2004.6 188184,5 3036,7 2484,3
2004.7 187460,4 1289,9 51,4
2004.8 191961,1 375,4 0
2004.9 173361,9 3424,8 0
2004.10 141407,3 4488,7 3998,1
2004.11 147740,4 4210,8 27272,9
2004.12 182621,6 10375,1 39830,3
Source: COMEXT and authors’ calculations
The summary Table 4 shows that impacts of trade liberalisation are different depending 
on the scenario chosen. The removal of entry prices and the tariffication scenarios have 
relatively larger trade effects. Every scenario including the removal of border measures 
largely benefits imports from Morocco, except for the preference erosion scenario. This 
suggests that for this country, multilateral trade liberalisation is as important as bilateral 
trade liberalisation concerning the EU fresh tomato market. A TRQ enlargement would 
have less dramatic impact on Moroccan sales as these seem constrained by the entry 
price system. Preference erosion does not appear a big issue for Moroccan exporters.
Table 4 Impacts of trade liberalisation on fresh tomato market (2004)
Summary (yearly data: 2004)
Percentage (%) Quantities (tonnes)
Scenario EU MO ROW EU MO ROW
Enlarged TRQ -0,43 10,86 -1,56 -9361 20757 -829
Agreed Entry Price -5,70 174,98 -14,33 -124497 334543 -7600
MFN Entry Price -5,86 171,80 11,14 -127979 328477 5911
Tariffication A -2,45 55,92 22,05 -53432 106914 11698
Tariffication B -5,01 151,36 -11,52 -109339 289398 -6113
Preference Erosion -0,31 -0,97 30,80 -6855 -1862 1633913
Fresh tomato could well be considered a sensitive good for EU producers as they would 
favour an enlargement of TRQs instead of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisations. 
The removal of the entry price system will have a relatively large effect, which involves 
the reduction of EU sales by more than 5%. The adoption of the uniform tariff would 
have lesser negative impact on EU sales, as the protection is rebalanced across the year. 
As for ROW’s exporters, they would loss with the specific phasing out of the Moroccan 
entry price and with the adoption of a uniform tariff. Export gains for ROW would 
result of the across-the board tariff reduction (Tariffication A), of a unilateral decrease 
in MFN effective protection and of the removal of the MFN entry price.
Monthly effects are quite variable depending on the studied scenario. Most of the trade 
impacts of the entry price and tariff liberalisations would concentrate on the period 
January-March (when the Spanish production is larger), and in April (when the Dutch 
production emerges in the fresh tomato market). The TRQ enlargement would have 
only marginal effects except for March, November and December. The phasing out of 
MFN entry prices benefits both MFN and Moroccan suppliers, except for February,
March and May, when the ROW’s exports decrease because of the removal of a barrier 
that also constrains the relatively competitive Moroccan exports. The tariffication A and 
the further tariff reduction would benefit ROW exports during all the year. A uniform 
tariff would instead hamper both ROW and Morocco’s exports in the last part of the 
year,  because  this  would  imply  larger  tariffs  for  the  period  between  August  to 
December.
Percentage price changes with respect to the benchmark scenario are dramatic in the 
scenarios  of  multilateral  and  bilateral  liberalisation  of  entry  prices  and  tariffs,  in 
particular, for the first four months of the year. EU internal prices could decrease by 
almost 20% in the scenario of MFN entry price elimination (January), and would also 
imply a two-digit reduction in February and April. In this last month, trade liberalisation 
appears especially important for Moroccan exporters, who could see their export price 
increased  by  20%  in  the  scenario  of  “Agreed  entry  price”  elimination.  Moroccan 
exporters  are  less  sensitive  in  the  scenario  of  preference  erosion  and  only  would 
increase their price marginally in the scenario of enlarged TRQs, except for March.14
6. Conclusions and further developments
We have undertaken the building up of a partial equilibrium model that would be of 
help  to  assess  the  impact  of  trade  liberalisation  scenarios  related  to  Mediterranean 
product, in particular F&V. Recognising that the simulation tool still has some way until 
it  becomes  fully  operative,  the  F&V  trade  model  is  already able  to  provide  with  a 
framework, ready to use, to assess EU trade agreements that affect selected F&V. The 
F&V model has been applied to fresh tomato market, in the preliminary simulations 
presented in this document, and it can be easily extended to other horticultural products 
which  appear  sensitive  for  the  EU.  The  model’s  value  added  lies  in  the  detailed 
specification of policy instruments and in the monthly differentiation of trade impacts, 
which vary seasonally in this kind of goods.
The first simulations  have been applied to  the  fresh tomato  market and  have  given 
preliminary information on the impact of selected scenarios of trade liberalisation. As 
regards to EU producers, bilateral trade liberalisation with extension of TRQs would be 
the least dramatic scenario. By contrast, the phasing out of the entry price system would 
have  serious  consequences  on  EU  producers.  The  model  has  also  given  detailed 
information on Morocco’s interests in the negotiation, although it could easily include a 
larger  number  of  suppliers.  Morocco  appears  to  be  interested  in  multilateral 
liberalisation as well as in bilateral liberalisation. In fact, multilateral liberalisation will 
not cause a great deal of preference erosion against Moroccan exporters, unless tariff 
reductions only affect MFN suppliers.
In  the  worst  case  for  EU  producers  (entry  price  elimination),  EU  supplies  would 
decrease by 20% in some periods of the year, although impact would be lower in the 
second  half  of  the  year,  when  current  protection  is  smaller.  Price  decreases  in  the 
sensitive months (first quarter could reach 10%.
Further developments of the model have to be addressed to improve the database, but in 
particular, the accuracy of the parameters used, such as the CES and the import demand 
and supply elasticities. The model has to get some degree of dynamics, as consumer and 
producer decisions in one month could affect decisions in other periods of the year.15
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